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We  summarize  the  results  of  a recent  statistical  analysis  of  216  nuclear  energy  accidents  and  incidents
(events).  The  dataset  is twice  as  large  as  the  previous  best  available.  We  employ  cost  in US  dollars  as
a  severity  measure  to facilitate  the  comparison  of  different  types  and  sizes  of events,  a  method  more
complete  and  consistent  that the  industry-standard  approach.  Despite  signiﬁcant  reforms  following  pastuclear power
uclear safety
uclear accidents
disasters,  we  estimate  that, with  388  reactors  in operation,  there  is a 50%  chance  that  a Fukushima  event
(or  more  costly)  occurs  every  60–150  years.  We  also  ﬁnd  that  the  average  cost  of  events  per year  is  around
the  cost  of the  construction  of  a new  plant. This  dire  outlook  necessitates  post-Fukushima  reforms  that
will truly  minimize  extreme  nuclear  power  risks.  Nuclear  power  accidents  are  decreasing  in  frequency,
.
ublisbut increasing  in  severity
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. Introduction
It has been more than four years since an earthquake and
sunami caused an accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power
lant in Japan resulting in repeated ﬁres and three reported core
eltdowns. At the latest count, the accident had caused $166 bil-
ion in damages1 [1] and at least 573 immediate deaths from the
vacuation, along with hundreds of future deaths related to can-
er anticipated to occur [2]. Somewhat sweeping industry reforms
ere called for, and public acceptance of the technology plum-
eted [3]. Supporters of nuclear power were quick to point out
hat a complete phase out would complicate efforts at mitigating
reenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector [4] and could
ead to cumulative global losses in global gross domestic product
5].
The March 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident is a poignant
eminder that disasters of enormous consequences can occur in
he nuclear industry. But how often and with what severity? These
wo questions constitute the core of sound risk management, which
equires identifying and quantifying such potential losses and their
requencies. For most natural and human-made catastrophes such
s earthquakes, meteorites, avalanches, mountain collapses, forest
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ﬁres, hurricanes, epidemics, health care costs, war sizes, terrorist
intensities, cyber risks, dam failures, industrial disasters, and so
on, plentiful historical data has allowed scientists and engineers to
determine the distributions of losses.
The admittedly favorable situation of a paucity of nuclear acci-
dents, combined with scantly available public historical data, has
prevented any such statistical analysis. Nuclear engineers have thus
resorted to the classiﬁcation of hypothetical accident scenarios
deemed credible and of their potential consequences. The com-
mon  industry approach to assessing nuclear accident risk depends
on a technique known as probabilistic safety analysis (PSA), which
assigns probabilities and damage values to particular failure sce-
narios. Nonetheless, such techniques are known to poorly predict
events and to under-appreciate incidents that cascade into failures
[6–11,12].
Similarly, the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) pro-
vides the INES (International Nuclear Event Scale) to communicate
the severity of nuclear accidents on a progressive discrete scale
of 1 (anomaly) to 7 (major accident), meant to correspond to
the amount of radiation released by order of magnitude. Yet its
approach has been critiqued for offering relatively crude scores, for
reporting only a fraction of known events, for not being transpar-
ent in its methodology, and for being more of a public relations tool
(propaganda) than a meaningful metric [9,13]. For instance, there
are about 12,000 events reported by French operators every year,
of which 600–800 are classiﬁed annually as “signiﬁcant for nuclear
safety,” yet little to none of these show up on the INES database, and
such unreported events occur at just 15% of the currently operating
world nuclear ﬂeet [14].


























































each event. Rate estimates for 2014 remain in a conservative range
of 0.0025–0.0035, or 1–1.4 events per year over the entire nuclear
ﬂeet. The methodology used here is described in SM2.
3S. Wheatley et al. / Energy Resea
In this study, we summarize the results of a statistical analy-
is of a dataset of 216 events (incidents and accidents) occurring
n nuclear energy systems [15], a dataset that is twice as large as
ny of the previous best ones available in the scientiﬁc literature
8,16], but we refrain from using the INES data directly. Instead,
e use the estimated cost in USD (US dollars) as the common met-
ic that allows one to compare often very different types of events
cross the nuclear fuel cycle. This dataset has more than three times
he number of accidents compared with studies using solely the
NES data, providing a much better basis for statistical analysis
nd inference, and a better comparative tool for reassessing the
afety of nuclear power. Following Chernobyl, several authors pro-
osed utilizing a monetary value of damage severity to make events
omparable, and use a rate measure normalized by the number
f reactor operating years to consider frequency [17–19]. This is
hat we have done here, but extending the range of analysis well
eyond 1986 to include Fukushima and other nuclear events lead-
ng up until the end of 2014. The dataset has been published online2,
here the public is encouraged to review and recommend addi-
ions and modiﬁcations with the intention of continually expanding
nd improving the quality of the data.
. Methods
There are many ways to quantify the risk of accidents in nuclear
nergy systems. The Farmer curve is one of the standard tools
f nuclear risk assessment, with the risk deﬁned as “probabil-
ty × consequences” [20]. Typical Farmer plots display the annual
requency of fatalities or of property damage from human made
ources of risk. Remarkably, the nuclear risks reported in Farmer
lots are fundamentally different from all previously mentioned
isks, in that the distributions for nuclear event losses are always
hin-tailed and Gaussian-like, presenting a downward concave
hape in the standard log–log representation.
The appearance of the Soviet Union’s Chernobyl accident in
986 and of Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant acci-
ent, after the tsunami on 11 March, 2011, seem at odds with
he statistics implied by the Farmer curves. Actually, following the
hernobyl accident, Hsu [17] and Sengor [18,19] suggested a differ-
nt approach, based on the reasoning that the number of fatalities
s an incomplete, if not misleading, metric for measuring nuclear
osses given the difﬁculties in assessing long term real mortality
n addition to early morbidity and mortality. Indeed, this met-
ic misses many other dimensions and also prevents quantitative
omparisons. Hsu in particular made the point that the statistical
nalysis of earthquake risks, for instance, would have missed the
undamental Gutenberg–Richter magnitude–frequency law [21] if
eismologists had focused on only the few large earthquakes. By
onsidering a range of event sizes above which the data is known
o be sufﬁciently complete, or at least representative, one can iden-
ify possible statistical regularities that are relevant to the largest
vents.
Here, we analyze the distribution of losses resulting from all
ossible types of nuclear events from 1952 to 2014. To be consis-
ent with both the INES, as well as earlier peer-reviewed studies
8,9], we assessed events across the entire nuclear fuel cycle—that
s, not only at nuclear reactors and power plants but also at ura-
ium mills, fuel enrichment facilities, reprocessing stations, and
uclear waste repositories. In addition to maintaining consistency,
his inclusion of non-reactor events is also necessary to trace the full
mpact of nuclear power technology on society as well as to account
or the fact that many sites prone to accidents concentrate multi-
2 See https://tasmania.ethz.ch/index.php/Nuclear events database.ocial Science 15 (2016) 96–100 97
ple elements of the fuel cycle in one location.3 Searching historical
archives, public utility commission ﬁlings, regulatory reports, and
other sources explained in SM1, we  created a unique dataset of 216
nuclear events, with 104 of these events having at least $20 mil-
lion in inﬂation-adjusted cost.4 In addition, whenever events had
the same dependent cause, such as Fukushima, we treated them as
a single occurrence. As it is important to evaluate the number of
accidents relative to the number of reactors in operation, we  have
normalized our assessment to operational reactor data from the
IAEA [22].
To be fair, a few caveats and limitations deserve mentioning. In
this study, we  focus only on damage and loss of life from nuclear
accidents, and not other externalities such as lung cancer risks from
coal mining or particulate pollution from petroleum-fuelled auto-
mobiles. Consequently, our study details the risks present from
continuing to operate existing reactors, it does not assess the risks
from not operating them (such as greater reliance on fossil fuels)
[4]. Also, as is typically the case in data such as this, there is an event
severity level below which events are less frequently reported, or
even noticed—making our analysis conservative because of incom-
plete data. We base our analysis on the current reactor ﬂeet, heavily
tilted towards older light water reactors (often called “Generation
II” technology), not state-of-the-art designs such as the European
Pressurized Reactor or “paper” units at the conceptual stage such
as small modular reactors, primarily because there is insufﬁcient
operating experience for their statistical analysis, but also since the
adoption of these designs is uncertain. Our characterization of the
current risk level, and its use for forecasting, presumes that 388
reactors remain in operation, and does not include any potential
improvements in response to Fukushima. Any signiﬁcant nuclear
renaissance or massive build-out would alter our characterization,
as would any massive phase-out. Lastly, we limit our assessment
to nuclear generated electricity and its fuel cycle, and thus exclude
risks posed by nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons, except for
those facilities (such as reprocessing spent fuel) that are dual use.
3. Results and discussion
We quantify four identiﬁable dimensions of risk: (i) historical
frequency of accidents, (ii) historical costs, (iii) the presence of so-
called “dragon kings” and extreme events, and (iv) expected future
costs.
In terms of frequency, panel (I) of Fig. 1 plots the number of
events with at least $20 million in damage (and standard errors) per
reactor per year, calculated on 5 year windows spanning 1960 to
2014. The main message here is that the rate of events has dropped
substantially since the 1960s, and may  have stabilized since the late
1980s. In panel (II) of Fig. 1 the rate of events is calculated running
away from the Chernobyl accident in both directions. From here it
is clear there was a signiﬁcant decline in event frequency after the
Chernobyl accident, and the rate of events since that drop has been
roughly stable, indicating that Chernobyl was a catalyst for change
that decreased the rate of events, but not necessarily the size ofSellaﬁeld in the United Kingdom, for instance, is home to commercial reactors,
research reactors, waste repositories, and reprocessing facilities and Fukushima
Daichi in Japan was home to commercial reactors and waste repositories.
4 The analysis here is focused on events with at least $20 million USD in damage.
These events are more visible and thus the dataset is more likely to be complete
above this threshold. Therefore statistics on this subset will be more reliable than
when considering smaller events. Further, these large events are most relevant as
they drive the total risk level. For instance, the ten most costly events contribute
approximately 94% of total costs to date.
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Fig. 1. Frequency, damage, and severity of nuclear power accidents.
Panel (I) plots the rate (annual number of events with cost in excess of USD 20 million per reactor) calculated for ﬁve year periods, with standard error bars given.
Panel  (II) plots the rate estimate running both backward and forward from the Chernobyl accident in 1987, bounded by standard errors.
Panel (III) plots the NAMS (Nuclear Accident Magnitude Scale) and damage/cost data according to their CCDF (Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function). The CCDF
























ror  the 15 largest points. The dashed line overlaid on the post TMI cost CCDF is a Pa
anel (IV) plots the logarithm of damage/cost versus the INES (International Nucle
ach  INES level with enough points. A linear regression ﬁt to the scatterplot is over
In terms of historical severity, panel (III) of Fig. 1 plots both
ost and the Nuclear Accident Magnitude Scale (NAMS) [9] accord-
ng to a complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF)
escribed in SM3. As the ﬁgure demonstrates, the damage CCDFs
orresponding to the periods of before and after the Three Mile
sland (TMI) major accident of 1979 are different. It is most plau-
ible that this change was a reaction to TMI, which involved both
mproving safety standards as well as reporting more events.
We  also ﬁnd that the heavy tailed Pareto distributions are insuf-
cient to account for the extreme empirical tails in the sense
hat a few exceptional events are “outliers”, or better said, are
ragon-kings, revealing the existence of transient ampliﬁcation
echanisms. Such dragon-kings are found to “coexist with power
aws in the distributions of event sizes under a broad range of con-
itions in a large variety of systems” [23]. As described in SM4, the
resence of dragon-kings provides a diagnostic for the existence of
ausal factors behind accidents not apparent from the main Pareto
odel used for the distribution. The dragon-kings are shown with
 marks in panel (III) of Fig. 1. The main point here is that post-
MI  moderate severity events are suppressed but extreme events
scalate to the extent that statistically signiﬁcant dragon-kings
merge in both NAMS and damage, exhibiting a runaway disaster
egime.t for the 90 largest points. The x marks indicate events that are outlying.
nt Scale) scores for each event. The median and quartiles of damage are given for
Next, bringing together models for rates and magnitudes, we
quantify the current risk level for the existing nuclear ﬂeet, which
may  be used as a status-quo characterization of the future risk
level using the methods described in SM5. Presuming a low rate
 = 0.002, and without considering the effect of dragon-kings, the
0.99 quantile is $54.3 billion, almost ﬁve times the estimated dam-
age from Three Mile Island. Presuming the moderate rate  = 0.003,
with the dragon-king effect, this quantile is $331.6 billion, which is
almost double the estimated damage of Fukushima. In other words,
there is a 1% probability each year that an accident occurs that leads
to a loss of at least $331.6 billion. Such large numbers do not appear
to be taken into account in standard calculations on the economics
of nuclear power [24]. Moreover, according to our analysis, with
388 reactors in operation, there is a 50% probability of a Fukushima-
like event (or more costly) every 60–150 years, and a Three Mile
Island event (or more costly) every 10–20 years.
Finally, panel (IV) of Fig. 1 compares our estimated costs with
INES scores, indicating inconsistencies where events deviate from
the exponential growth in cost qualiﬁed by the line in the loga-
rithmic scale. The multitude of dots above or below the INES scale
strongly suggest it fails to adequately capture the magnitude of
events. For instance, Fukushima (the largest event) would need
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onsiderable uncertainty in the INES scores as evidenced by the
verlapping costs.
. Six conclusions and policy implications
Our study reveals six important conclusions about the risks
f nuclear power. First, concerning event frequency, our analysis
hows that the rate of civil nuclear accidents over time since 1952
ecreased signiﬁcantly from the 1970s, reaching what appears to
e a stable level of around 0.003 events per plant per year. In
his sense, nuclear power is getting safer, although this improve-
ent could be offset by the construction and operation of many
ew facilities. We  ﬁnd concrete evidence of a history of learning
rom previous accidents within the industry, especially the signif-
cant reduction in event frequency after the Chernobyl accident
n 1986, and a suppression of moderately large cost events after
MI.
Second, however, is that these past reforms, rather than min-
mizing risk, have apparently spawned the prevalence of dragon
ings and accidents with major costs. Chernobyl and Fukushima
re both such dragon kings, as they together represent 84 percent
f the total damage in our dataset. The morphology of nuclear acci-
ent risk has altered from more frequent, less costly events to less
requent, more costly events.
Third, existing databases are woefully incomplete when it
omes to the reporting of nuclear incidents and accidents. For
nstance, only half of the events in our database have INES scores,
nd thousands upon thousands of small events – but with the
otential to cascade into larger ones – remain unreported. As the
uthors of [14] concluded, “many nuclear safety related events
ccur year after year, all over the world, in all types of nuclear plants
nd in all reactor designs and that there are very serious events that
o either entirely unnoticed by the broader public or remain sig-
iﬁcantly under-evaluated when it comes to their potential risk.”
 fully transparent, centralized source of reliable data on nuclear
ccidents is needed; one that enables planners, investors, and even
uclear regulators to better comprehend, and then weigh, nuclear
isks. Such full disclosure will need to be balanced with the legit-
mate security concerns of the nuclear industry and the need to
void promoting a culture of panic and hysteria.
Fourth, apart from being incomplete, industry standard tools
uch as the INES scale of the IAEA are inadequate and inconsis-
ent at identifying and projecting nuclear accident risk, especially
elated to dragon kings. For the costs to be consistent with the
NES scores, the Fukushima disaster would need to be between an
NES level of 10 and 11, rather than the maximum level of 7. To
se an analogy, the INES scale is like the antiquated Mercalli scale
or earthquake magnitudes, which was replaced by the continu-
us physically-based Richter scale. Instead of INES, we recommend
he use of continuous scales genuinely based on relevant physical
ariables (radiation emission as in NAMS) and/or economic metrics
dollar costs as proposed here) and that these scales be publicly dis-
losed for as many events as possible, including all of those in our
atabase.
Fifth, we need to better understand “near misses,” “false neg-
tives,” “minor mishaps,” and “residual risk” [14]. Our study has
ocused only on “extreme risk,” that is, accidents that precipitated
t least $20 million in damages, but an entire class of narrow
scapes exist, unplanned or unanticipated events and warnings that
ever resulted in damage [25,26]. In the European Union, for exam-
le, legislation called the Seveso directive5 has emphasized, since
982, the importance of near-misses for hazardous accidents on
5 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/.
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land, especially in the oil and gas industry. A similar directive ought
to be considered for the nuclear industry, and it requires a com-
plete data set of both small and large events to properly quantify
the frequency with which small events escalate into larger ones.
Sixth, future frequency and severity of accidents are perhaps
unacceptably high. While the nuclear industry can be character-
ized by an impressive improvement in incident prevention and
safety procedures, our thorough analysis of this new data shows
that, when a nuclear event of at least $20 million in damage occurs,
the probability that it transforms into a catastrophe with damage
larger than one billion dollars is almost ten percent. Under the
status quo, we project at least one Fukushima-scale dragon king
(or larger) accident with 50% probability every 60–150 years. And,
more common but still expensive events of about $20 million will
occur with a frequency of about one per year—making accidents a
relatively routine part of nuclear power’s future.
In conclusion, although the frequency of events per reactor has
become less common, the relative frequency with which events
cascade into “dragon king” extremes is large enough that, when
multiplied by severity, the aggregate risk to society is still very
high. To effectively reduce this risk, the possibility of Chernobyl
and Fukushima sized events needs to be better anticipated and then
more effectively managed.
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